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The question on the interconnection 
between culture and psychology seems trivial, 
as the interconnection is evident. However, in 
reality it is not so simple. For many decades 
anthropologists have been suggesting different 
versions attempting to explain the interconnection 
between culture and psychology, but all of them 
were disposed of one by one. The idea that a 
human personality is formed in the early years 
of life in the process of socialization determined 
by culture seemed self-evident, but as no one 
could prove it, it was also disposed after all. All 
scientific descriptions of national character  were 
based upon this particular idea, that claimed to 
be theoretically substantiated, relied on. Back in 
psychological anthropology there were several 
concepts of intracultural integrators that reduced 
personality and culture to common denominator 
by pointing out such dominating personal 
peculiarities of a culture’s members, as “basic 
personality structure”, “modal personality” and 
others. However, by the mid-20th century it had 
been recognized that no culture, not even any of 
those called primitive, had anything similar to 
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“modal personality structure” (Inkeles, Levinson 
1969: 427-428).
For a long while after that the connection 
between culture and psychology was considered 
nonexistent or, in any case, to be ignored or 
possible to factor out without prejudice to science, 
as it was believed that psychology did not make 
a direct impact on the functioning of culture, 
just like culture made no direct impact on the 
formation and functioning of human psyche, and 
all the so-called cultural-psychological processes 
were nothing but a phantom. Then it was suggested 
that anthropology, psychology, sociology, social 
psychology might exist independently from 
each other without penetrating into each other’s 
field, and in their mechanical aggregate they 
were capable of explaining all phenomena of 
cultural, and social life, as well as formation and 
development of human personality. However, at 
the time there was no field of research left for 
psychological anthropology. 
As long as anthropology studies the 
functioning of culture, the question was finally 
reduced to the definition of culture. Since the 
early 60-s and until the early 80-s the majority 
of anthropologists saw culture as a system of 
meanings (signs, symbols) that presented a 
sophisticated and tight entwinement (due to its 
out-scientific character, post-мodernist critical 
approach in cultural anthropology was not taken 
into account). The culture bearers, their words, 
dialogues, actions and interactions were also 
seen as meanings (signs, symbols). Therefore, 
culture turned explainable in its own terms. As 
understood, before it had also been suggested that 
people thought somehow and reacted somehow to 
the outer world, but it had never been recognized 
as a phenomenon directly connected to culture. 
It was common to believe that to understand 
a culture it was enough to know some explicit 
human actions, such as their visible deeds 
and utterances that were interpreted from the 
anthropological point of view. However, what 
the people thought, what they felt, what emotions 
they experienced and concealed, what they 
preferred to hide and why, what they assumed 
by this or that statement, what they realized 
and what remained unrealized, what the real 
motivation for human behavior might be, all these 
were considered to be the subject of psychology, 
which was of no interest for anthropologists. This 
approach (named “symbolic anthropology”) was 
evidently limited, though internally consistent. 
It was impossible to be easily upturned; it had 
to be overcome. That is the main question set 
to psychological anthropology is: how to prove 
the inextricable interdependence of culture and 
psychology. 
Since the late 20th century, one of the 
peculiarities of psychological anthropology 
has been its adoption of the cognitive approach 
terminology. The cognitivist terminology 
apparatus was used to overcome the anti-
psychologism of the symbolic approach, at the 
same time preserving all the constructive elements 
present in the latter. In the discussion cognitive 
and symbolic anthropologies concerned, first of 
all, one of the most underlying questions: are there 
any cultural systems within or beyond the human 
mind? Cognitive anthropology studies human 
mind and suggests that culture is concentrated 
inside a person. Symbolic anthropology studies 
objectivized culture and has no interest for what 
is happening inside the mind: according to it, 
culture lies beyond the human psyche. At the 
same time psychological anthropologists strived 
to prove that the internal and external systems of 
meanings were interconnected, and, moreover, that 
this connection was able to produce motivational 
mindset of a person, thereby provoking human 
activity.
The present article suggests such model of 
culture that assumes a direct connection between 
culture and psychology; but we will study the 
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question from a new angle, which, on one hand, 
complies with all the achievements of the modern 
psychological and cognitive anthropologies, and 
on the other, respects the achievements of Russian 
science. Let us attempt to trace the culturally and 
psychologically determined human behaviour 
from individual perception of the outer world to 
the functioning of society as a whole from this 
point of view.
***
Let us begin with the question of how 
external world realities turn into intrapsychical 
cultural realities, or, “meaning systems”, 
according to the terminology introduced 
by American cognitive anthropologist Roy 
D’Andrade. We shall also use the “material 
flow” term D’Andrade defined as follows: 
“There is a major class of human phenomena 
that is not organized as meaning systems, which 
I term material flow. By material flow I mean 
the movement of goods, services, messages, 
people, genes, diseases, and other potentially 
countable entities in space and time” (D’Andrade 
1984:110). As we suppose (perhaps, operating 
the term somewhat wider than D’Andrade did 
himself), “material flow” may include any other 
phenomena that did not become artefacts for 
these or those reasons, and, therefore, are not 
fully perceived by people in the culture, as they 
are not meaningfully represented.
To be perceived by people, phenomena need 
to become artefacts or “meaning systems”: 
mental artefact complexes that are included 
into culture understood as a “field of action”. 
Very tentatively, we shall interpret the notion of 
culture on the basis of the definition formulated 
by German cultural psychologist Ernst Boesch. 
According to him, “Culture is a field of action, 
whose contents range from objects made and used 
by human beings to institutions, ideas and myths. 
Being an action field, culture offers possibilities 
of, but by the same token stipulates conditions 
for, action; it circumscribes goals, which can 
be reached by certain means, but establishes 
limits, too, the correct or deviant actions. The 
relationship between the different material as 
well as ideational contents of the cultural field 
of action is a systemic one; i.e., transformations 
in one part of the system can have an impact on 
any other part” (Boesch 1991: р. 29). In order 
to become a component of a “cultural field 
of action”, a “material flow” element has to go 
through some mental operations. In this process 
some components of the “material flow” will 
inevitably remain beyond the human perception 
as lying outside the “intentional world” of a 
human being.
Here is what cultural psychologist Richard 
Shweder writes of intentional worlds: “Intentional 
things are causally active, but only by virtue of our 
mental representations of them. Intentional things 
have no “natural” reality or identity separate 
from human understandings and activities. 
Intentional worlds do not exist independently of 
the intentional states (beliefs, desires, emotions) 
directed at them and by them, by the persons who 
live in them” (Shweder 1991: 48-49). Moreover, 
Shweder says: “Intentional worlds are human 
artefactual worlds populated with products of our 
own design. <…> A sociocultural environment 
is an intentional world. It is an intentional world 
because its existence is real, factual, and forceful, 
but only as long as there exists a community of 
persons whose beliefs, desires, emotions, purposes 
and other mental representations are directed at it, 
and are thereby influenced by it” (Shweder 1991: 
74). Therefore Shweder, besides the “intentional 
world” notion, introduces the notion of an 
“intentional person”: “Intentional persons and 
intentional worlds are interdependent things that 
get dialectically constituted and reconstituted 
through the intentional activities and practices that 
are their products…” (Shweder 1991: 101).
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***
So, how do external world realities become 
intrapsychic cultural realities?
A part of “material flow” elements go through 
it automatically in the process of transmission. 
Progressively, as a child socializes, he adopts 
certain “event cultural scripts”, and as he 
adopts these cultural scripts, he also digests 
its components, from separate artefacts and 
artefact complexes to cultural schemes or 
models of behaviour. In other words, a child 
perceives whole cultural schemes deployed 
in time. As children get involved into the 
“interpsychic” (interpersonal) interaction with 
other people, this interaction gradually becomes 
“intrapsychic” (internal, psychologically 
adopted) or “interiorized”, (Miller 1993: 421). 
According to Katherine Nelson, socializing 
their children, adults do more about directing 
their actions and setting their goals than about 
teaching them directly, immediately. Adults use 
their cultural scripts’ knowledge to set some limits 
to thus, the children action, thereby allowing 
children get involved into the role behaviour they 
are expected to show, i.e. act in accordance with 
a definite cultural script. This way the adoption 
of such scripts plays the central role in culture 
adoption (Nelson 1981: 110). At the same time, 
the whole cultural context determines the 
selection and implementation of the adopted 
scripts. Adopting such cultural scripts, the child 
also adopts artefacts around him, appropriate 
models of interaction and ideational contents of 
the cultural field of action, and the “intentional 
world” itself where he is going to live (Cole 1996: 
208). And the children themselves become cultural 
objects, artefacts, as they enter the world 
Another part of “material flow” elements is 
adopted by means of some constant perception 
complexes belonging to a certain culture (we 
shall talk about it later), that correct the process 
of human perception bringing it into a culture-
determined framework. By means of these 
constant complexes, an object or a phenomenon 
gets represented in the human mind, i.e. 
becomes an artefact. Here we may, to some 
extent, agree with the statement by psychological 
anthropologist Theodore Schwartz that culture 
consists of derivatives of experience, more or less 
organized (Schwartz 1994: 324-325). 
Let us summarize everything said above 
and formulate some key suggestions to be 
discussed further. First of all, we assume that 
constant perception complexes themselves can 
be regarded as artefacts. Being specific psychic 
processes that regulate the sociocultural 
activities of a person, they are also a product 
of cultural activities of people and, therefore, 
may be presented as culture-determined, 
and unconscious elements of human psyche. 
Secondly, if a person “learns” a certain way 
of perception through his participation in a 
culture, or, to be more precise, in various scripts 
it provides, perception and activity should be 
regarded as two tightly intertwined processes. 
Therefore, we may draw a preliminary conclusion 
and suggest that structure-forming elements of 
a culture are the perception paradigms that 
determine the character of human activity in 
the world. Thirdly, the paradigms that determine 
the structure and, partially, the contents of a 
culture itself, as a rule, remain non-realized, 
as otherwise a person would have been able to 
construct a culture and convenient cultural scripts 
at his own choice relatively easily. And, fourthly, 
these paradigms are immediately correlated with 
the artefacts of culture and sets of the person 
to them. Let us begin the analysis of the above 
statements from the latter, i.e. from the notions of 
artefacts and sets.
***
The notion of “artefacts” is quite diverse 
today. It leads to the natural tendency of 
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building an artefact hierarchy. The most widely 
spread hierarchy is the one suggested by Marx 
Wartofsky which goes as follows: (1) primary 
artefacts: material and ideal artefacts (objects 
or phenomena, as well as our representations of 
them); (2) secondary artefacts: representations 
of models of actions with primary artefacts; 
and (3) tertiary artefacts: the “free game” 
(operation of artefacts with no relation to the 
external world, its tendencies or any associated 
necessities) (Wartofsky 1979). Using a similar 
scheme, Michael Cole adds “cognitive 
artefacts” into his hierarchy (Cole 2003). The 
concept of “cognitive artefact” was initially 
suggested by Donald Norman whose objective 
was to reveal how and when the cognition of 
physical artefacts is formed in the human mind 
(Norman 1975). For Norman, thinking is an 
autonomous kind of human activity, and artefacts 
are something external for human thinking. They 
influence, but do not construct it; they cannot be 
active inside human psyche. However, the most 
important point for Cole is that an artefact acts 
within the cognitive system, and cognition is 
a process that occurs in an individual’s head. 
According to Cole, cognitive artefacts set up 
some information processing mechanisms (Cole 
2003). Cole’s expansion of the notion brings its 
advantages. It gives us an opportunity to define 
not only the objects and phenomena, external for 
a human mind as artefacts, but also classify the 
intrapsychical ones as artefacts if they have been 
developed as a result of some cultural processes. 
Cole speaks of the “creatures whose minds are 
made through artefacts” and claims that “articles 
are, in some respects, models. Their structures 
carry within them, so to speak, a “theory” of 
both the human who is using them and the range 
of environmental circumstances in which they 
will be normatively used <…> as a synthesized 
ensemble that satisfices the constraints of the 
human user and the task at hand”. Cole believes 
that “at the same time artefacts are transformers, 
enabling the metamorphoses of what we refer 
to as external into internal and vice versa” and 
supposes that “because they enter intimately into 
human goal directed action, there is a functional 
aspect to all artefact-mediated action. And for the 
same reasons artefacts embody values (oughts, 
shoulds, and musts); in this sense all culturally 
mediated action is, at least implicitly, moral 
action” (Cole 2003). Cole does not speak directly 
of the motivational components of artefacts, but 
for him artefacts are, on one hand, procedural 
constructs, and on the other, value constructs, 
and therefore, as such, they cannot but perform 
the motivation function.
Concerning the latter aspect, a researcher 
similar to Cole is Herbert Simon, for whom 
artefacts always remain a product of human 
activity, i.e. they are “synthesized by human 
beings” (Simon 1981: 8). Moreover, it is relevant 
for us that Simon also speaks of such components 
of artefacts as goals, (as the motivation component 
of artefacts cannot just be left out in everything 
that concerns goals), functions (the process 
component is evident) and acts of adaptations 
(including the psychological ones connected with 
the “intentional worlds”).
The resulting hierarchy of values is the 
following: (1) material artefacts (2) ideal artefacts 
(let us define them as miscellaneous, as all of 
them are not the same) (3) cognitive artefacts, 
representations or schemes of an object in the 
consciousness or sub-consciousness of a person, 
(4) models of actions with artefacts (including 
scripts), as well as (5) goals (after Simon) and 
values (after Cole), adding (6) intentional worlds 
(after Shweder) that are also artefacts that can be 
compared to tertiary artefacts of M. Wartofsky. 
After D’Andrade, (1) are related to the category 
of symbols (D’Andrade 1994), (2) – to meaning 
systems, (3), (4), and (5) – to schemes of various 
types.
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So, we can see that cognitive anthropologists 
and cultural psychologists speak of artefacts as 
of mental phenomena. We shall follow them, but 
we shall try to deepen this approach. To do this, 
let us turn to the concept of a “set” just as we 
promised before.
American cultural psychologists are mostly 
thrilled about the artefact theory by Soviet 
psychologist L.S. Vygotsky and particularly 
about his famous triangle of “subject – 
mediating tool – object” (Cole, 1996). Even 
though, according to Vygotsky, artefacts do not 
lie in such evidently mental sphere as they are in 
the vision of American cultural psychologists, in 
Soviet science Vygotsky’s theory had a sort of 
its mirror and mental reflection in the works by 
D.N. Uznadze, less known internationally. He 
suggested his own triangle of a “stimulus – set 
(unconscious readiness, willingness) for action – 
reaction”, which can be easily transformed into 
“subject – set – object”. Remaining within 
cultural psychology tradition to classify mental 
complexes as artefacts, we see that the “set” 
mentioned by Uznadze may be also qualified as 
an artefact. Comparing the triangles of Vygotsky 
and Uznadze (no one is known to have done it 
before), we get the following result:
Generally, the scheme can be presented as:
According to Uznadze, a set determines “a 
subject as a whole, which enters into a relation 
with the reality, therefore getting forced to turn 
to some psychic processes for help. Indeed, the 
subject itself in this case is primary, while its 
activity is something derivate” (Uznadze 1961: 
39-40, 169). And as according to Uznadze, a 
set is subconscious and is a modus of a whole 
personality, connected to a category of activity 
expressed through the readiness for some action, 
it is possible, with a proviso, also speak of an 
acting human personality as of an artefact.
The last statement matches cultural 
psychology perfectly; one of its representatives, 
Richard Shweder, introduced the concept of 
“intentional personalities” equally with the 
concept of “intentional worlds”. If “intentional 
worlds” (our sociocultural medium is also one 
of them), after Shweder, are artefact worlds, 
then “intentional personalities”, correspondingly, 
are artefact personalities, or, in other words, 
personalities producing material and ideal 
artefacts, running the cognition process through 
cognitive artefacts and performing actions with 
the sets of their personalities, withdrawing new 
“meaning systems” from the “material flow”. 
Cognitive artefacts, “meaning systems” and sets 
as artefacts are tightly intertwined. As stated 
by Uznadze’s follower, Sh.A. Nadirashvili, 
with the occurrence of a set to act in a certain 
direction, a person “influenced by it, notices and 
considers only those objects and phenomena 
that are connected to the set in this or that way. 
Neutral objects and phenomena, irrelevant 
for such set, remain unnoticed. The statement 
has been proven by a number of experimental 
results… Only those thoughts and contents of 
consciousness pop up in the person’s memory, 
that are related to the current set in this or that 
way. Matching this to the concept of “meaning 
systems” and “material flow” by Roy D’Andrade, 
we see that we speak of the same thing. But 
Mediating tool
*
Subject * * Object
*
Set
cognition-mediating 
artefact
*
Subject * * Object
*
action-mediating 
artefact
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essentially Nadirashvili also speaks of the way 
how “flow material” elements become “meaning 
systems” through the mediation of perception 
complexes born by sets. The function of a set is to 
select objects, contents of consciousness, general 
experience and knowledge from the surrounding 
medium and the person’s previous experience 
that are necessary for the desired behaviour” 
(Nadirashvili 1978: 12). It means that it is only 
action that is determined by the a; at the same 
time, it is also perception, and interpretation. 
Action and perception act as an inseparable 
integrity, determined by one common set, which, 
in its turn, is determined by what Uznadze 
referred to as “modus of personality”.
Therefore, being an artefact which can be 
regarded both as (3 – cognitive artefact) and as 
(4 – model of action) within the hierarchy shown 
above, a set is related to the integrated cultural 
field (to 6 –“intentional world” and “intentional 
personality). A set is mediated by the connection 
between personality and cultural field. And 
as, according to Uznadze, a set may be fixed, 
i.e. stable, continuous, we may also say that a 
determining culture, a set underlies various 
cultural representations.
So, subconscious sets (consciousness is 
not involved at all!) “filter” the “material flow”, 
promoting something into “meaning systems”, 
and returning some former “meaning systems” 
into “material flow”. This way they determine the 
perception of both external world and our inner 
experience. Therefore, sets work as tools for 
representing an artefact and our consciousness 
as an artefact in the process of action, and 
determining the direction of such action.
As we are speaking of processes that occur 
within the framework of culture, we may mention 
not only exclusively psychological, but also some 
cultural and psychological complexes involved in 
the representation process, uniting in themselves 
the “meaning systems”, models of actions and 
sets, that in totality constitute cognitive artefacts 
(or perception complexes).
***
In the context of everything said above let 
us look at cognitive artefacts as at perception 
complexes. Being specific psychic processes, 
regulated (besides conscious regulation, it can be 
done unconsciously, through sets) by sociocultural 
activity of a person (consisting of cultural models 
of action, a part of which are unconscious, i.e. 
based on the existing sets), perception complexes 
themselves are a product of cultural activity of a 
person. Moreover, in cognitive artefacts even the 
procedural components of perception themselves 
(not only their result) implicitly contain and 
assume the presence of certain action models. 
Indeed, in a way they can be taken as a special 
case of cognitive artefacts, but it is relevant for 
us to outline the perceptive-activitive artefacts. 
It means that we may speak of the perceptive-
activitive artefacts that integrate models of 
action with models of perception. This is what 
we call “cultural constants”, one of the key 
terms of our own concept of culture we are now 
approaching.
But let us return to “meaning systems”. 
They may both appear in the process of activity 
by themselves (extracted from “material flow”), 
and provoke such activity (actualizing the 
cognition connected to the “meaning system”). 
It does not only happen through its motivation 
function that joins culture with psychology, 
as mentioned by D’Andrade (D’Andrade 1994) 
and some other psychological anthropologists, 
such as Milford Spiro (Spiro 1984) or Robert 
LeVine (LeVine 1984), but also through a set, 
an underlying intention of human personality, 
developed (at least partially) and acting within 
a cultural framework, i.e. through transforming 
motivation into an instinctive necessity to do 
something in a certain way (with an appropriate 
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cultural pattern). As claimed by Nadirashvili, 
this necessity may be fixed: “Such attitude 
to things can be situational, momentary, but 
it may get fixed and become chronic… In the 
process of set fixing some laws have been found 
that aid the formation of a certain personality 
type” (Nadirashvili 1978: 13). An inclination to 
“synthesizing” these or those “meaning systems” 
becomes fixed. A way of perceiving reality in the 
way determined by one’s culture also becomes 
fixed. So does motivation for some certain 
activity. Such fixed cognitive-perceptive-
motivation-pattern complexes are what we 
call “cultural constants”, where we easily find 
the interconnection between cognitive artefacts 
and set-artefacts that have been developed in the 
process of human activity, and, particularly, in 
the process of interaction between individuals 
actualizing various cultural scripts.
***
A complex of cultural constants is a schematic 
prism through which a person looks at the world 
where he must act. It creates basic paradigms that 
determine possibility and conditions for human 
activity in the world, and it is around cultural 
constants that the whole structure of being is built 
in the human consciousness. It is due to cultural 
constants, that a person obtains such “image of 
the surrounding medium” where all elements 
of the universe are structured and related with 
the person himself, and only within which a 
person may act. That means that only thanks to 
cultural constants “intentional personality” and 
“intentional world” are formed.
Just like “a set creates a psychological 
base for adopting a person to the surrounding 
medium and for transforming it according to 
his needs” (Nadirashvili 1978: 14), cultural 
constants establish the target and the method 
of the subconscious culture-determined 
adaptation of the world to the personal needs, 
as well as the adaptation of the person to the 
world.
A cultural constant complex includes such 
dynamic paradigms that reflect perception and 
set for action determined by this perception 
at the same time. At first glance, they may be 
operationally defined as some sorts of “images”: 
images of a source of good and a source of evil, 
a protecting and an opposing power, a we-image 
(an image of a group of people able to act), image 
of a field of action, condition of action, source 
of action, method of action and other possible 
images associated action of a person in the 
world. Besides the properties of such images, 
their disposition, ways of interconnection and 
interaction between them are of paramount 
relevant.
Thus, a cultural constant complex happens 
to be a system of images that describes the arena 
of action of a person as a member of the group 
that is the primary “we” for him (let us remind 
the reader that Shweder speaks of a so-called 
“intentional action” (Shweder 1991: 101)). And if so, 
there appears a base for the reaction of “external” 
(intentional) conflicts in a “dramatized” way, 
through the interaction of images, specific and 
peculiar for every culture (we do not yet speak 
of the internal conflicts determined through the 
acceptance of being as intentional reality by a 
person as an “intentional personality”; we only 
speak of the conflicts within the framework of 
the intentional world itself). Every image has its 
own “character” and certain relations with other 
images. Through them, every culture obtains a 
“canon of reality perception”, which is a complex 
of cultural representations. From this point 
of view, human activity is presented as an 
interaction of images, within which a person 
develops his behaviour, as though becoming one 
of the components of this perpetually moving 
system. And in this very context, which, actually, 
is culture, his fixed sets are developed.
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***
Let us explain the functioning of cultural 
constants on a relatively simple example. Let’s 
say, that according to the rules of some story 
genre, some characters are supposed to be there: 
a villain, a knight, a lady etc. In each and every 
story these characters have names and individual 
features, but some common properties and 
models of relationships between them, dynamics 
of the plot required by the story genre remain 
the same. Generally, culture creates a similar 
canon for universe perception. It establishes 
such paradigms of perception that all objects or 
features of the external world are either matched 
to the “images” developed by culture, subject to 
more or less significant distortions, or are not at all 
perceived by a person within the given culture.
As environment of a sociocultural system 
changes, the cultural, political, economic 
conditions the people lives in also change. It 
means, that the experience the people is expected 
to perceive and its structure also changes. It is 
like a new play written under the same canon, but 
based on a new plot. The “pictures of the world” 
will change, but thanks to “cultural constants” 
their underlying structure will remain the same. 
One “intentional world” will replace another, 
but their fundament will still remain the same, 
based on the same “cultural constants” in the 
same dispositions; the “skeleton” of culture 
will remain, but the “meat” on the “skeleton” 
will be different.
“The New Guinea tribes-man whose inkblot 
responses were our starting point may in a decade 
have gone from his tribe’s traditional model of the 
cosmos <…> through a series of radical shifts. 
A Fundamental missionary may have persuaded 
him that in the Book of Genesis and what follows 
lies the source of the white man’s power. Within 
five more years he is voting for a representative 
in the House of Assembly, is co-owner of a truck, 
and has heard about men’s landing on a moon he 
perceived as a totemic deity ten years back. It is a 
mystery how a man can cope with such chaotic 
shifts of consciousness and remain sane?” 
asked (maybe the basic question of anthropology) 
anthropologists R. and F. Keesings (Keesing, 
Keesing 1971: 357). Maybe the reason why the 
man remains sane is that such shifts may be not 
chaotic at all. Their main concern are the things 
the things that are not related to the frame of 
the current culture. The “skeleton” of the “New 
Guinea tribes-man” remained the same; the 
only components that changed were those, the 
mobility of which was allowed by his culture. 
And it makes no difference if for an external 
observer the changes seem global: every culture 
has its logic.
“Cultural constants” are not the contents of 
“images”; they are general “formal”, “technical” 
characteristics ascribed to them, which finally 
determine the order of manifestation and 
perception of all the images involved in the plot. 
Certain filling of the paradigms may vary, and 
that is when new modifications and “images of 
the world”, as well as all other images, occur. But 
in any case their filling will maintain the general 
attribute of all the images, their disposition, vision 
of the action modus the same and unchanged. 
These are the constants the cultural tradition in 
different modifications is crystallized around.
***
“Сultural constants” are not realized 
by a culture representative. They are tools 
for structuring and “rationalization” of the 
experience obtained from the external world. 
Though the “world view” formed in people’s 
consciousness on the basis of cultural constants 
may be criticized, cultural constants themselves 
are not subject to the people’s judgments at least 
because people do not see or aware of them. 
This is where the protective mechanisms of the 
human psyche play their part. Thanks to them, 
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cultural constants never reveal their contents 
immediately in the consciousness of their 
bearers; they pop up only as ideas of some certain 
problems or objects, i.e. in the maximally specific 
shape. Going through the protective barrier of 
human psyche, cultural constants are, in a way, 
fractionized: they enter the consciousness zone 
not as a universal rule, common for a number 
of various phenomena, but as a vision of the 
most convenient action for the specific moment. 
Moreover, the ways of manifestation of cultural 
constants may be so diverse and multiple that 
sometimes it is really difficult to find a common 
tendency underneath.
The diversity of the ways for cultural 
constants to reveal themselves provides their 
“invisibility” and “invincibility”. In the event of 
an evident contradiction in the manifestation of 
cultural constants or a critical mismatch of the 
constants with the reality, it is not the cultural 
constant that is threatened, but a certain form of 
its manifestation. Some behaviour pattern may 
be rejected by an individual or a community as 
inconsistent, but the subconscious basis of this 
pattern will remain unchanged and find, in this 
way or another, its manifestation in some other 
forms. Therefore, in the periods of modification 
of the cultural consciousness, cultural constants 
just change their “costumes”. 
***
The filling of cultural constants with 
some certain contents is a way of joining 
subconscious images with real phenomena 
(but not always within a specific tradition), or, 
speaking in psychoanalytic terms, is a transfer, 
or transposition of a unconscious complex 
to a real object. Such joining may be more or 
less stable and remain as long as an object can 
bear such a load within the culture-determined 
“picture of the world” and culture-determined 
experience of people, until it does not diverge 
from reality too much. Then another transfer 
occurs, but it is a transfer to a different оbject 
already. It is the intentional world transformation 
law. This is how, for example, the development or 
replacement of the “image of the protector” and 
“image of an enemy” (personified or not) occur. 
Another similar phenomenon is what we 
may refer to as autotransfer: a person ascribes 
some properties typical of the unconscious “self-
image”, “we-image” (concept of “we” and concept 
of “I”) to himself. Therefore, a person is creating 
himself as an intentional personality, inscribing 
himself into the intentional community and the 
intentional world. The structure of relationship 
between unconscious images is transferred 
onto real experience, determining the ways of 
people’s actions (intentional action). People act 
in compliance with the properties they transfer 
onto themselves, within the framework of the 
vision of the community, its properties and 
relations lying in their unconscious. Therefore, 
“material flow” is used to extract some new 
elements that previously remained unnoticed an 
ignored; they become “meaning systems”, while 
others that formerly constituted the “meaning 
systems” will either retain their status as history 
and archaeology, or be thrown away, flushed back 
into “material flow”.
The object the transfer is made on 
becomes the key of the current version of the 
cultural tradition. All meaning connections of 
the ”world view” are concentrated around such 
“relevant objects”; they also set the plot in the 
life of society (sociocultural system), as they act 
as mediators for projecting the conflict between 
the “image of the source of good” and the “image 
of the source of evil” the culture assumes or 
allows, onto actual reality.
***
As new “meaning systems” become such 
and are then adopted, interiorized by a person 
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dynamically, i.e. as a culture-determined script 
unfolds, we may suppose that cultural constants 
underlie the scripts admitted by the current 
culture as desired or acceptable, and, moreover, 
they serve as a base for building such scripts. In 
order to build such dynamic constructs as cultural 
scripts on the basis of cultural constants, it is 
necessary for the cultural constants themselves, 
acting as culture-determined mental images 
forming the basis for the culture as it is refracted 
in the psyche of its carrier, to be involved in 
dynamic interaction with each other. Culture is 
a “field of action”, as defined by Ernst Boesch (as 
we have mentioned above) not only because all 
of its elements interact with each other, but also 
because the frame the WHOLE culture is built 
on is dynamic in its core. This is the only fact we 
may use to explain how changes in one elements 
of the cultural system may lead to changes in its 
other elements without breaking the culture as 
a whole.
It is easier to understand as follows: cultural 
constants contain some models of actions that 
are the sets for some certain activity and the 
idea of the way of activity, the totality of which 
constitutes a prototype of a script that finds its 
reflection in any script brought to life.
In culture, any set provokes a counter-
set, thereby creating a frame of sets, on which 
“meaning systems” are “woven” and fixed, 
turning from “material flow” components into 
artefacts. It happens in the process of actualization 
of various specific cultural event scripts. New 
sets do not appear spontaneously; their target and 
intention is determined by culture as a whole. 
The frame for matching all possible specific 
scripts to be actualized in this or that culture is 
an idea of interactions underlying the culture, 
or, to be more precise, an idea of a principally 
possible structure of interactions acceptable in 
the given culture (considering all alternatives 
accepted by the culture). This idea is projected on 
every bearer of the given culture as an individual, 
acting within the culture. Intentionality, let it 
be general universal (“intentional world”) or an 
individual (“intentional personality”) one, reflects 
the idea of an action, an action of an “intentional 
personality” in the “intentional world”. Actions, 
activity of a personality in the world are the 
contents of the “intentionality” category not as 
much in the aspect of its objects, but in the aspect 
of its formal characteristics, and, therefore, of its 
models. The models are united into integrities 
of models, which are scripts, and scripts are 
generalized into the basic structure of a culture 
that we may refer to as unconscious internalized 
(implicit) general cultural script. Though it 
is not the “intentional world” itself yet, it is the 
frame, its “intentional scheme”.
Being an intentional scheme, general 
cultural script is specific for every culture, it lies 
beyond culture and bears a conflict in itself. 
Its extralogic nature is partially explained by its 
function to psychologically adapt the external 
reality, to make it more comfortable for people 
even if by distorting its perception (i.e. a 
general cultural script itself turns a person into 
an intentional personality within his culture) 
and a peculiar “rationalization”, for example, 
by psychological localization of all the evil 
of the world in one source, so that it does not 
seem to be spread all around the world. Being 
extralogical, or, to be more precise, intentionally 
logical, intentionally rationally perceivable, 
reality inevitably becomes fundamentally 
contradictory in the human consciousness, 
evoking certain sets for action to smoothen the 
contradictions. That is what motivate a person 
into action, i.e. directs him to actualize the old 
cultural scripts or to “spontaneously synthesize” 
some new ones on the basis of an existing script 
frame. Therefore, being intentionally perceived, 
objective reality becomes a projection of a 
general cultural script. That is how a cognitive 
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artefact gains its motivation power, forcing a 
person to act in order to minimize the perceived 
contradictions, stimulates development of a 
set as an unconscious need for an appropriate 
cognition of activity.
Adoption of a culture by a child, or 
enculturation, means adoption of the script 
“intentionality”. Transmission of culture from one 
generation to another is carried out as a human 
being digests a huge amount of cultural event 
scripts and has the main principles of interaction, 
typical for the given culture, condensed in his 
consciousness and, what is especially important, 
in the unconscious. That is how a person 
unconsciously adopts, unconsciously generalizes 
cultural properties, cultural models determining 
the interaction patterns, and thereby perceives 
the implicit general cultural script specific for 
his culture. It should be noted that interaction 
principles can be common on different levels and 
in various aspects.
The implicit general cultural script may be 
correlated to the cultural constants complex, 
i.e. with the general scheme of perception-
interaction in the world typical of the given 
culture. The cultural constants complex includes 
the vision of the ”right”, “correct”, and, partially, 
appropriate interaction (unlike the cultural script 
that creates the whole spectrum of interactions 
possible in the given culture). A general cultural 
script and cultural constants complex are two 
sides of the same medal, and both of them 
may be presented, on one hand, as a prism the 
culture bearer is looking at the world, and on 
another hand, as a totality of culture-determined 
models of action. Cultural constants complex 
is a perceptive-activity scheme, and general 
cultural script is a projection of this scheme 
on the “intentional personalities” acting in the 
intentional world.
Cultural constants complex may be to 
some extent defined as an idealized vision of the 
condition of the world making this or that action 
convenient, adapted to the human being, while 
implicit general cultural script is principally 
implicit. Moreover, if cultural constants may be 
sometimes decomposed into several elements, it 
is very complicated to do with a general cultural 
script. If cultural constants provide a sort of 
schematization of the general cultural script, its 
modal basis, then a general cultural script, being 
wider than this projection-scheme itself, includes 
all variations of actualizing cultural constants, 
acceptable and possible in the given culture. A 
general cultural script is a sophisticated cultural 
complex which includes clusters for ALL 
possibilities of perception and action represented 
in the given culture. A general cultural script 
is a skeleton of culture with a spine consisting 
of modal possibilities, modal structures of 
perception and action and branches of all the 
opportunities thinkable in the current culture, 
potentially including all variants of actions 
acceptable by the culture.
***
A general cultural script determined 
six types of artefacts listed above: (1) material 
artefacts (because they become meaningful only 
in the context of a “general cultural script”); 
(2) ideal artefacts (because they get inscribed 
in the models of action and become culturally 
meaningful through the general cultural script); 
(3) cognitive artefact (perception, representation 
or a scheme of an object associated with a set 
and, through the set, with a model of action in the 
consciousness and subconscious of an individual); 
(4) models of actions with the artefacts acting as 
a base for building specific and, inter alia, event 
cultural scripts; (5) objectives and values (as the 
ones determining the perception of reality and the 
direction of a set to an action); (6) intentional worlds 
(the only ones where intentional personalities 
may act). Now let us also add (7) cultural space 
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of an action, including cultural constants as 
“technological images”. Let us remind the reader 
that artefacts (3), (4), and (5) are categorized as 
schemes. Now we may also specify that all the 
schemes correlated the intentional worlds with the 
cultural space of action. As schemes, cultural 
constants determine the modality of a general 
cultural script.
***
The cultural constants concept helps 
developing such an idea popular in psychological 
anthropology, as “distributing model of 
culture” that was promoted, particularly, by 
Theodor Schwartz (Schwartz 1994; Schwartz 
1989; Schwartz 1978). 
Similarly, in our “general cultural script 
concept” distribution of culture between its 
carrier also takes place; on the basis of the 
“cultural constants” the totality of “pictures of 
world” different from each other, for example, on 
the basis of various values, is formed.
It is important that “cultural constants” 
themselves do not contain any vision of the 
intention of the action and its moral evaluation. 
The intention and objective of the action may be 
set by “value configuration”. Cultural constants 
and value configuration are correlated as a 
way of action and an objective of action. 
Further, the picture of the world (intentional 
world) may be regarded as derivative from 
cultural constants on one hand, and from the 
value orientation on the other. The existence 
of different value orientations, specific for 
different sociocultural system members and 
their socio-functional groups, inevitably leads 
to the fact that a sociocultural system does not 
have a single picture of the world (not a single 
intentional world), but a complex of intentional 
worlds interconnected with each other (having 
one and the same frame, which is the cultural 
constants system).
There is another component connected to 
the picture of the world, which is the cultural 
theme, the central theme for a given society. It 
would be correct to regard the “cultural theme” 
(ethos, culture pattern) (Benedict 1934: 36-37) 
as a type of a stable transfer which reflects the 
paradigm of “activity condition” in a culture 
bearers’ psychology. Being a result of a stable 
(which does not mean indestructible) transfer, a 
cultural system is included into the world view 
of various intracultural groups, and, therefore, 
into various value systems, and can manifest 
itself in diverse, or even mutually opposite 
interpretations. This or that perception of the 
“central cultural theme” depends on the value 
orientations of the sociocultural system members 
and their social-functional groups.
We may suggest that the distributing of 
culture (disintegration of the central cultural 
theme), based on the integral cultural constants, 
has a functional meaning. If a cultural constants 
system acts both as a model for the culture 
bearers’ action in the world, and as a model 
for their interaction with each other, then the 
distributing of culture is something like a trigger 
for a sociocultural system’s self-organization. 
Activity in the world and self-organization 
are two sides of the same medal. Through the 
dynamic perception of the surrounding world a 
cultural system structures both the “external” 
reality and itself as a component of such reality. 
If reality manifests itself to a human being as an 
arena, a field of action in a certain world view, 
then there is no surprise that it presents a system 
where it is possible to maintain balance and 
stability only if the system remains dynamic.
***
Cultural models of interaction are 
adaptation-activity models, regulating the 
character of sociocultural community members’ 
activity and interaction in the world, formed on the 
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basis of a general cultural script appropriately 
refracted in certain situations. These models 
are the results of such refractions; they belong 
to different intracultural groups, interact with 
each other, so that in each of the groups the 
transfer objects are corrected in such a way that 
the intensiveness of the “image of the source 
of evil” decreases, and the images of “we” and 
the “protector” is enhanced. The interaction of 
different intracultural groups follows the cultural 
models of interaction as “role-playing” of these or 
those main aspects of the cultural theme. It is not 
always easy to see the common base in different 
situations. Quite often adaptation-activity 
models do not have any ideological substance; 
people follow them just because it is convenient 
for them to act this way, and only post-factum 
people substantiate their actions in any way.
If a world view as a derivative of the cultural 
constants’ complex is a principally dynamic 
system, it means that it initially contains a conflict 
perception of the world. Evidently, the conflict 
between the images of “we” and the “source 
of evil” is preset in it. And the perception of 
one’s native culture and society assumes some 
internal conflict, as the society structure is far 
from homogenous and it is not easily matched 
into the “we-image”. The existence of different 
pictures of the world based on common cultural 
constants, but different value systems, different 
interpretations of the basic cultural themes within 
one sociocultural system, leads to an inevitable 
conflict within a sociocultural system. And as 
the cultural constants system sets certain type 
of relationship between different components 
of the sociocultural system, it also sets the 
structure of the conflict itself, that acts as an 
“engine” that maintains the dynamism, essential 
for the survival of the given sociocultural system. 
It means that the intracultural conflict is 
functional. Every intracultural group acts by itself 
within its intentional world, and it is like a drama 
that unfolds act by act, where every action seems 
isolated and independent of the whole structure, 
but all of them still lead to creation of new social 
institutions, providing the sociocultural system 
as a whole with the opportunity of constructive 
activity. As in a picture of the world reality is 
always schematic, i.e., distorted, from outside 
the actions of the people may seem “not 
straightforward”, illogical. A human action, as 
it becomes a cultural phenomenon (artefact) 
and matches into the general structure of being, 
may be completely understood and rationally 
explained only within the logical framework of 
the given culture.
The topic of adaptive origin and the 
adaptive function of the interiorized general 
cultural script is worth separate mentioning. 
One of the central messages of psychological 
anthropology is the statement of an underlying 
connection between the immediate medium 
where a human being exists and the fundamental 
distinctive categories of his mind (Spiro 1984). 
The medium surrounding a human being is full 
of devices and tools (adaptations) of behaviour 
used by the previous generations in an 
embodied and (to a great degree) external form, 
remarked Michael Cole (Cole 1995:7). Famous 
culture expert Edward Markarian explained 
understanding of culture as a specific way of 
human activity, a way of human existence of 
adaptive nature. Ethnic cultures are historically 
developed ways of activity that have been 
ensuring the adaptation of various peoples to 
the conditions of the surrounding natural and 
social environment (Markarian 1978: 8-9). 
But what prevents us from stating that the 
medium surrounding a human being is full of 
“devices and tools (adaptations) of behaviour” 
having also a psychological and an ideal form, 
together with the “sets”? That is, first of all, the 
“function of culture as a specific means of 
human adaptation” (Markarian 1998: 84).
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Let’s draw some conclusions.
We understand culture as a complex 
of meaning systems of different degrees of 
complexity, both conscious and unconscious. 
By meaning systems we understand a totality 
of mental components of artefacts of all levels, 
where the core is composed by a general 
cultural script, as only in a connection 
with it different objects and actions become 
meaningful in culture: from cognitive schemes 
of different things to event scripts, from material 
culture objects to their algorithms of operation, 
from simple instructions to the complicated 
self-organization mechanisms of the given 
culture bearers’ population (sociocultural 
systems), from intentional worlds to intentional 
personalities.
The core of culture (“the central zone” of 
culture) is manifested in the “general cultural 
script”, a projection of “cultural constants”, that 
determine the action conditions and interaction 
character for the persons and intraethnic groups 
involved in bringing it to life. The distribution 
of cultural roles or the distribution of culture 
happens in accordance with the general cultural 
script. This script determines the character 
of reality perception and the mechanisms 
for modifications and transformations of the 
whole sociocultural system which functions 
according to the script. Culture is a principally 
dynamic system. In the most general cultural 
script there is a functional conflict that allows 
a sociocultural system to preserve itself and 
maintain itself only in a dynamic balance, 
i.e. to remain in a continuous functional-
conflict communication and interaction of the 
intracultural groups, thereby supporting the 
mechanisms of adaptation and transformation 
in the “operative” condition all the time.
A sociocultural system is a totality of 
bearers of this or that culture, united, first of all, 
by a general cultural script, allowing them to 
maintain the necessary level of communication 
and interaction in any situation. The presence 
of a functional intracultural conflict and its 
flawless operation proves a normal, active 
state of a sociocultural group (as it is the only 
condition when a culture performs all of its 
functions appropriately), and the circle of 
people able to take part in the actualization 
of the functional intracultural conflict, being 
the megascript of the given culture, draws the 
boundaries of such sociocultural community. 
In the end, this is the kind of participation that 
proves that a person belongs to the culture and 
acts in accordance with the implicit general 
cultural script set by it.
For the future development of culture 
studies it is required to shift from the totality 
of anthropological disciplines, such as 
psychological and cognitive anthropologies, 
to psychological culture studies, that would 
not only explain the culture-determined 
vision of the world and its influence on human 
activity (or, on the opposite, the influence 
of activity on the vision of the world), the 
correlation between mental meanings and 
external reality, distribution of culture and 
its adaptive, motivational, communicative, 
distributive functions, but also on the basis of 
culture-determined understanding of human 
psyche explain the functioning of society 
as a sociocultural system, mobile, alive, 
continuously changing, able to overcome crises 
and restructure itself in accordance with the 
current conditions and necessities.
The complex of anthropological sciences 
in the psychological culture studies part needs 
to be completed with Christian anthropology 
that would reveal not the illusory, but the true 
opportunities of human freedom, freedom 
of will, in this world that seems to be utterly 
determined by adaptations and culture, or in 
the world after the fall from grace.
– 852 –
Svetlana V. Lourié. Culture as a Field of Human Action…
References
Boesch, E. (1991). Symbolic Action Theory and Cultural Psychology. Berlin, Heidelberg, NY, L., 
Paris, Tokyo, Hongkong, Barselona, Budapest: Springel-Verlag.
Benedict R. (1934). Patterns of Culture. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Cole, M. (2003). Culture and Cognitive Science. Talk Presented to the Cognitive Science Program, 
U.C. Santa Barbara. Available at: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/278406542_Culture_and_
Cognitive_Science (accessed on 22 September 2015).
Cole, M. (1996). Kul’turno-istoricheskaia pskihologiia [Cultural and historical psychology]. 
Moscow, Kogito-centr.
Cole, M. (1995). Kul’turnye mekhanizmy razvitiia [Cultural mechanisms of development], In 
Voprosy psikhologii [Psychology issues], 3.
D’Andrade, R. (1994). Cognitive Anthropology, In Schwartz Th., White G., Lutz С. (eds.) New 
direction in Psychological Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
D’Andrade R. (1994). Shemas and Motivation, In D’Andrade R., Strauss C. (eds). Human Motive 
and Culture Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
D’Andrade, R. (1984). Cultural Meaning Systems, In Shweder R., LeVine R. (eds.) Cultural 
Theory. Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. Cambridge, L., NY., New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: 
Cambridge University Press.
Inkeles, A., Levinson, D. (1969). National Character: The study of Modal Personality and 
Sociocultural Systems, In Lindzey C. and Aronson E. (eds.). The Handbook of Social Psychology. Vol. 
IV. Massachusetts (Calif.), London, Ontario: Addison-Wesley.
Keesing P., Keesing F. (1971). New Perspectivers in Cultural Anthropology. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston.
Markarian, E. (1998). Capacity for World Strategic Management. Yerevan: Gitutun.
Markarian E. (1978). Ob iskhodnykh metodologicheskikh predposylkakh issledovaniia 
etnicheskikh kul’tur [On primary methodological prerequisites of ethnic cultures’ research], In 
Metodologicheskie problemy etnicheskikh kul’tur. [Methodological problems of ethnic cultures]. 
Erevan, izd-vo AN Arm.SSR.
Miller, J. (1993). Theory of Developmental Psychology. NY: Freeman.
Nadirashvili, Sh. (1978). Psikhologiia propagandy [Propaganda psychology]. Tbilisi: 
“Mecniereba”.
Nelson, K. (1981). Cognition in a Script Frammework, In Flavell J. and Ross L. (eds.) Social 
Cognitive Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Norman, D. (1975). Explorations in cognition. San Francisco: Freeman.
Prangishvili, A. (1985). Ustanovka kak neosiazaemaia osnova psikhicheskogo otrazheniia [Set 
as an intangible base of psychical reflection], In Prangishvili A.S., Sherozija A.E., Bassina F.V. (eds.) 
Bessoznatel’noe. Priroda, funktsii, metody issledovaniia [The unconscious. Nature, functions, methods 
of research]. Tbilisi: “Mecniereba”, 4.
Schwartz, Th. (1994). Anthropology and Psychology, In Schwartz Th., White G., Lutz С. (eds.) 
New direction in Psychological Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schwartz Th. (1989). The Structure of National Cultures, In Funke P. (ed.) Understanding Of 
USA: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Tubengen: Gunter Narr Verlal.
Svetlana V. Lourié. Culture as a Field of Human Action…
Schwartz Th. (1978). Where is the culture? In Spindler G (ed.) The Making of Psycholodgical 
Anthropology. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Shweder, R. (1991). Thinking Through Cultures. Cambridge (Mass.), London (England): Harvard 
University Press.
Simon, H. (1981). Sciences of the artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Spiro M. (1984). Some reflections on Cultural determinism and relativism with Special Reference 
to Emotion and Reason, In Shweder R., LeVine R. (eds.) Cultural Theory. Essays on Mind, Self, and 
Emotion. Cambridge, L., NY., New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press.
Uznadze, D. (1961). Eksperimental’nye osnovy psikhologicheskoy ustanovki [Experimental basis 
of psychological set]. Tbilisi: Izdatel’stvo AN GrSSR.
Wartofsky, M. (1979). Models Representation And The Scientific Understanding. Dordrecht: 
Holland / Boston: USA / L.: England: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Культура как поле человеческого действия  
(опыт построения  
психокультурологической теории)
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Россия, 190005, Санкт-Петербург, 
ул. 7-я Красноармейская, 25/14
В статье рассматривается гипотеза об обобщенном культурном сценарии, который 
пронизывает все аспекты жизни человека и общества. Обобщенный культурный 
сценарий специфичен для каждой культуры и формируется в сознании человека в процессе 
социализации и энкультурации. Это осуществляется, когда осваиваемые им частные 
событийные культурные сценарии конденсируются в его сознании и обобщаются. 
Рассматривается культурный контекст функционирования обобщенного культурного 
сценария – социокультурная система, состоящая из разных типов артефактов и в целом 
представляющая интенциональную систему. Сам обобщенный культурный сценарий 
рассматривается как интенциональная, артефактная система, превращающая человека 
в интенциональную личность. Ставится проблема о соотношении интенциональности 
человеческого мира и свободы воли. 
Ключевые слова: обобщенный культурный сценарий, социокультурная система, культурные 
константы, интенциональный мир, интенциональная личность, установка, артефакт, 
когниция, энкультурациия, свобода воли.
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